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Review by Maria Federica Moscati 
 
Philosophical Foundations of Children’s and Family Law offers a 
collection of fourteen elegantly written essays contributed by both 
philosophers and legal scholars. The essays speak to key themes in 
family and children’s law discourses including polyamory, child 
support, dissolution of same-sex relationships, and children’s rights.  
Lucinda Ferguson and Elizabeth Brake introduce the collection 
by presenting the themes of the collection and by providing insightful 
comparative reflections on the aims, arguments and methodology of 
the two disciplines, law and philosophy. The tension and combination 
of both disciplines shape the aims of the collection. On the one hand 
differences between law and philosophy aim to augment reflections on 
both disciplines. On the other hand, ‘combining insights from law and 
philosophy, we intend to add another layer to the current trend to 
focus on the empirical in family law research, and highlight how 
critical debates in children’s and family law are ay once theoretical 
and empirical’ (1).  
Although, the overall reflections on the collection are drawn 
later in the review, the reader should be aware that the collection 
fulfils the pursued aims! 
Following the Introduction, Part I is dedicated to the nature of 
family and family law. John Eekelaar’s essay reflects on family law 
and legal theory. Theories about family law, he rightly argues, should 
develop through an understanding of the interaction of legal and 
social norms. Central to such understanding are concerns about 
power relations that characterise several dimensions of family and 
children’s law. Thus, power imbalances might characterise the 
resolution of family disputes. Eekelaar suggests that legal norms 
should therefore be adapted to ‘minimize damage to the well-being of 
everyone affected’ (55).  
David Archard delves into the nature of ‘family’ and ‘family law’, 
offering three definitions of family: functional, formal, and ‘family 
resemblances’. He champions the functional family as important for 
providing the basis for family law. But this approach tends to neglect 
what family is for those who are members of the family. It is to those 
voices that family law should revert and listen to.  
The papers in Part II are mainly concerned with ‘Relationships’.  
Elizabeth Brake’s essay opens Part II, arguing convincingly for legal 
protection of adult caring relationships, including paid material 
caregivers. The essay explores the theoretical and practical 
implications of considering paid caregivers as family members. Indeed, 
the role that care/caring has within human relationships cannot be 
overlooked by family law (Herring, 2013). In emphasising the 
importance of intimacy, caring and relationships Brake suggests that 
challenging the dichotomy between work and care would extend the 
deserved family law protection to domestic workers (who receive legal 
protection under labour law).  
Ronald C. Den Otter’s fine essay, like Brake’s chapter, breaks 
away from a narrow understanding of family based on the norm of the 
heterosexual, two-person adult relationship. Otter advocates for the 
protection of polyamorous marriage. Starting with an analysis of 
American constitutional law through the lens of liberal principles, 
Otter links to Stuart Mill’s idea of experiments in living to then evince 
the individual and social benefits that polyamorous marriages might 
bring. At this point a reader might ask, what does refrain a society 
from recognising a variety of marital relationships and plural 
marriages? It is well-known, legal recognition of adult relationships 
are considered as instrumental in accomplishing the interests of a 
given community. But often the very true interests of a given 
community are neglected by prejudices and stigma which are not 
rooted in reality. Otter walks the reader into a convincing discussion 
showing that prejudices can be overcome and that a variety of marital 
arrangements would indeed add value to society.  
Robert Leckey’s chapter employs analysis of property disputes 
between cohabitants to answer ‘big questions – such as what people 
who live together should owe one another, and the balance between 
choice and protection’ (115). Leckey offers a stimulating perusal of 
English and Canadian judgments and highlights the institutional 
limits posed on judicial reform concerning cohabitation. The chapter 
suggests that default rules might be a more functional solution than 
individual choice approaches when considering legal regulation of 
cohabitation. Interestingly, the chapter concludes by pointing out that 
cuts to legal aid have reduced dramatically access to family justice. 
And contrary to Leckey’s concerns about choice, it must be 
emphasised that advocating for personal choices in resolving family 
disputes was at the core of the Access to Justice and ADR movements 
(Fuller, 1978).  
Charlotte Bendall and Rosie Harding then offer a fascinating 
analysis based on empirical data collected through semi-structured 
interviews with solicitors and clients on the dissolution of civil 
partnerships in England and Wales. The chapter analyses whether 
and how legal dissolution of civil partnerships encourages same-sex 
couples to conform to ‘heteronomative patterns of relating’. The 
authors focus on financial disputes and identify two main themes. 
First the clients interviewed reported discontent regarding the 
adversarial approach pursued by the lawyers and become keen to find 
private solution rather than recourse to formal legal processes. 
Secondly, the legal framework concerning dissolution of civil 
partnership promotes a rather heteronormative and assimilating 
approach that solicitors adopt when dealing with a dissolution 
between same-sex partners. According to the data analysed in the 
chapter, no differences were found in the way in which solicitors 
advise same-sex couples or construct the issues to be analysed and 
discussed during the dissolution.  
 These findings can be compared to other research concerning 
dispute resolution involving same-sex partners and parents. First, 
same-sex couples are being assimilated into opposite-sex couples in 
the resolution of parenting disputes. The debate (and related practice) 
concerning the involvement of children during family mediation has 
proceeded overshadowing the variety of family structures that same-
sex partners and parents create. Secondly comparative analysis has 
shown that the lack of harmonised legal recognition of same-sex 
unions has a direct impact on the nature of disputes, on the 
availability and choice of the method and on the resolution per se 
(Moscati, 2015).  
Lister’s essay closes Part II arguing that drawing upon family 
ties, immigration policies should provide family-reunion programmes. 
The chapter considers family unification and formation; the relation 
between justice and state discretion concerning family unification, 
and engaging with the debate on whether and how family unification 
might represent a violation of liberal neutrality. The attention that 
Lister pays on the rights of children and the issues they raise for 
immigration law and policy deserve special mention. Correctly, the 
author argues for full access to citizenship and social services.  
Part III is dedicated to “Rights and Obligations”. Diane Jeske 
suggests that a broader notion of intimate relationships should inform 
analysis concerning family and marriage. After depicting the nature of 
intimacy and its moral significance, Jeske guides the reader through a 
discussion on the role that political and legal institutions play  and 
the approaches they take to engaging with moral and legal obligations 
to support intimate relationships. 
The other three chapters in Part III propose a balanced 
interdisciplinary overview regarding the nature and justification of 
children’s moral and legal rights. Colin M. Macleod, in his essay, 
suggests that ‘a satisfactory moral theory that purports to be 
comprehensive must take children seriously’ (190). He develops his 
convincing argument by showing that the diffidence towards 
children’s rights and which draws upon foundation scepticism and 
discourse anxiety is not compelling.  
To some extent Macleod’s aim sits close to Lucinda Ferguson’s. 
In her essay Ferguson argues that legal decisions concerning children 
should prioritise children as ‘special case’. Academic debate and legal 
decisions do not seem to prioritise children’s interests as the  
governing law – in particular section 1 of the English Children Act 
(1989) – requires. Ferguson unfolds and frames her discussion 
engaging with a critical and convincing analysis of four main 
objections moved to the prioritization argument. Scott Altman’s essay 
completes Part III, offering the reader a somewhat different approach 
from that of Macleod and Ferguson. The focus of Altman’s essay is 
parent’s moral claims to control their children. His lucid account of 
the nature and basis of such claims speculating on the importance of 
authenticity to justify parent control rights is nevertheless limited by 
an absence of attention to the children’s position and voice. 
In the Introduction Ferguson and Brake in presenting the 
essays concerning legal regulation on children, ask “Does it matter 
how we frame children’s legal relationships with others?”. Part III 
shows the reader that it is indeed very important to establish how to 
frame children’s relationships. However, what Part III misses is the 
need to consider the  children’s perspective. The arguments developed 
seem to proceed from a rather adult-centric perspective, whereas the 
recourse to child protagonism  (Liebel, 2007) could offer more 
contextualised and child focused solutions.  
Finally Part IV provides insights into ‘Regulation and 
Intervention’ of family and family life. Important questions concerning 
whether and how the state should regulate relationships are 
addressed by looking at private ordering in family law, surrogacy, and 
children rearing.  
Brian H. Bix starts with an overview of the variety of private 
ordering developed in the United States. The chapter proceeds with 
philosophical arguments underpinning the discussion on whether and 
how to regulate the variety of private ordering, reflecting on issues of 
autonomy, social utility, public policy, and personal dignity.  
James G. Dwyer delves into the debate concerning whether and 
how legal interventions inspired by liberal values should take into 
account minority-cultural practices. The chapter concludes by 
claiming that parents should retain the freedom to transfer cultural 
values to children unless such values will negatively affect the child. 
Perhaps here greater attention could have been given to the approach 
of ‘law as culture’ (Rosen, 2006). In the final contribution Mary 
Lyndon Shanley drawing upon ethics of care and theories of relational 
rights argues that these approaches might better endorse the rights 
and interests of all those involved in the web of relationships that 
surrogacy creates. Her approach is positive and robust, and could well 
be used to advance legal reforms. 
 
Two main reflections prompt the reader at the end of the book. 
Does this collection fully engage with philosophical foundations of 
children’s and family law? The answer depends on what part of the 
world and what philosophy a reader is concerned with.  There is 
something of a dissonance between what the editors suggest in their 
Introduction about the aims of the collection and the manner in which 
the contributors engage with philosophy and law. It is puzzling that 
non-Western legal cultures have been overlooked notwithstanding the 
very well-known examples of family law systems developed upon non-
Western and non-liberal philosophical thinking on matters of  family 
and kinship. Moreover, the philosophical reading of children’s and 
family law seems to be understated in the ‘conversation’ between law 
and philosophy. 
The second reflection is inspired by the editors’ suggestion that 
‘by contrast to philosophy’s focus on discerning true norms, the 
nature of legal practice encourages (academic) lawyers to be purposive 
in their focus on normative issues’ (3). Conversely, it could be argued, 
however, that disciplinary divides have been settled when 
philosophical discourses have formed the basis for family and 
children’s law. For instance, the inclusion of legal clinic projects 
within undergraduate and postgraduate law degrees and the 
development of cause lawyering (Sarat and Scheingold, 
1998)encourage legal scholars and lawyers to go beyond normative 
issues and to consider, and bring into practice philosophical 
discourses on equality and social justice.  
Also, there is the experience of various legal cultures in Asia 
and Africa to be considered. For instance, traditional  Chinese family 
law (both statutory and customary) was largely based on Confucian 
‘Five Human Relationships’ (Rosenlee, 2006), laying out a map for 
good conduct within the family in the interests of promoting harmony 
and stability. This traditional philosophical value teaching is still 
influential on child’s law (Palmer, 2010; 2017). Finally, philosophical 
arguments underpin judicial interpretation and decisions concerning 
family and children’s law. For instance, the landmark case Obergefell 
v. Hodges1  that legalised equal marriage in the US represents a good 
example where ‘A first premise of the Court’s relevant precedents is 
that the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the 
concept of individual autonomy’ (at 12).  
 
Nevertheless, this is a family and children law collection of 
essays that offer fascinating insights and encourage critical 
                                                        
1 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 
interdisciplinary thinking. It will prove to be an enjoyable read and a 
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